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In this paper, we propose a novel approach to enterprise mission
modeling and mission-centric decision support for cybersecurity
operations. The goal of the decision support analytical process is
to suggest an effective response for an ongoing attack endanger-
ing established mission security requirements. First, we propose
an enterprise mission decomposition model to represent the re-
quirements of the missions’ processes and components on their
confidentiality, integrity, availability. The model is illustrated in a
real-world scenario of a medical information system. Second, we
propose an analytical process that calculates mission resilience
metrics using the attack graphs and Bayesian network reasoning.
The process is designed to help cybersecurity operations teams in
understanding the complexity of a situation and decision making
concerning requirements on enterprise missions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As the IT infrastructures grow larger, it is more and more compli-
cated to protect them and all their components. The insufficient
workforce in cyber security and the risks of misunderstanding be-
tween security operations and management further underline the
problem. The security teams are not always aware of all the mis-
sions in an organization, nor knowing about missions’ priorities.
Under such circumstances, the risk of unwanted actions rises. For
example, dropping network traffic of an infected system interrupts
operations of a critical IT system or one of its dependencies, which
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was not known to the security team. Thus, we need to explore new
ways of transferring information from management to security
operations to relief the security operation teams and help both the
parties in a correct and efficient decision making.
A specific problem to be resolved is how to take enterprise mis-
sions into account when taking decisions in cybersecurity opera-
tions, such as impact assessment and incident response, including
restrictive countermeasures. There is a need to reflect the missions,
their supportive processes (assets), and their dependencies; and to
evaluate and capture the mission requirements in terms of the CIA
triad (confidentiality, integrity, availability). The key question is
how to quantify the mission resilience, i.e., how likely can a partic-
ular enterprise mission supportive process be affected and to what
extent. To answer this question, we need to conduct mission decom-
position and impact assessment so that we could provide necessary
cyber situational awareness for the decision support process.
Themission decomposition, i.e., clarifyingmappings of processes
via services to cyber components, should take into account the cur-
rent cybersecurity situation and events that appear in the network
operation process. In addition, it should clearly communicate cy-
bersecurity risks and mitigation measures between different groups
of involved stakeholders and prioritize the measures while factor-
ing their individual needs, e.g., its cost-effectiveness. Further, it
should enable recalculation of current mission security attributes,
i.e., the probability of successful mission disruption and its extent
regarding the CIA triad. The decision making support should be
built on mission’s ability of successful adaptation (reconfiguration)
in the face of actual adversary activities. Based on the current se-
curity information and events from network operation process, it
should enable quantitative security assessment and comparison of
the mission’s available configurations and identification of the most
secure one. It should also give a clear message to mission security
administrators and administrators of employed cyber components.
The paper contributions to state of the art could be summarized
as follows. First, we present an approach based on Constraint Satis-
faction Problem (CSP) to model enterprise missions and supportive
entities, which connects an organization’s missions and require-
ments on them with IT infrastructure. As a part of this task, we
performed a case study and an empirical evaluation of our approach
to illustrate its capabilities in today’s critical application domains
and its supportive infrastructures. The case study deals with a med-
ical information system for processing and sharing medical images
and involves geographically distributed user groups and network-
ing environments, strict requirements on confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of the data, and other distinct features. The pro-
posed methodology was empirically evaluated for the model of
this system. Second, we use the mission decomposition model as
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an input, along with abstract knowledge gained from a vulnera-
bility database and impact scoring system to construct a Bayesian
network based on attack graph and formulate a CSP that express
the mission resiliency needs. Calculations based on the CSP and
the Bayesian network are used to gain quantitative and qualitative
situational awareness, which can be used for decision support with
regard to enterprise missions.
This paper is divided into six sections. Section 2 summarizes re-
lated work. Section 3 provides the necessary theoretical background.
Section 4 introduces the approach to enterprise mission decompo-
sition and modeling based on constraint satisfaction abstraction
logic and illustrates it on a case study of a medical imaging infor-
mation system. Section 5 describes the analytical process that uses
the mission decomposition model and leads to decision support.
Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
The problems of impact assessment, mission resiliency, and deci-
sion support in cyber security are often referenced as parts of cyber
situational awareness [6, 10]. Cyber situational awareness consists
of three levels, perception, comprehension, and projection [6]. First,
we have to perceive the elements in the current situation, e.g., enu-
merating hosts and vulnerabilities in the network, locating critical
infrastructure, etc. Once done, we may proceed to comprehension,
e.g., understanding what threats are the network and critical infras-
tructure facing. Finally, when the second is reached, we may project
which threats are the most likely to lead to compromise or how
would that impact an organization’s missions. Similarly, the OODA
loop formalizes the decision process in four steps, Observe, Orient,
Decide, and Act [10]. First, we have to observe the situation and
orient in it. Based on the gained knowledge, one may adequately
decide how to react to such a situation, and act in a way that was
decided [10].
Impact assessment can be found in numerous publications, either
as a stand-alone research topic or as a part of a larger work. Porras
et al. [17] discuss M-Correlator, a mission-impact-based approach
to alert prioritization and aggregation. The objective of mission
impact analysis is to aggregate related alerts into incidents and rank
them based on the threat each incident poses to the operational
mission. Their approach relies on expert knowledge of critical sys-
tems and of most concerning attacks classes to those assets. The
attack impact assessment is very simple; for each alert, it takes into
account the criticality of the target asset and whether the alert is of
a type with a high threat to the asset. Valeur et al. [21] introduce a
comprehensive alert correlation system that also contains an impact
analysis component. To assess the impact, they require a service
asset database, service heartbeat monitors, service dependencies,
and service importance concerning the whole network. They deter-
mine the immediate impact of an attack by monitoring the services
dependent on the attacks service, searching for those, that were
negatively affected by the attack and computing the overall dam-
age to the mission. They use the assessed impacts to prioritize the
attacks for remediation. Their approach is very reactive as they do
not consider the possible continuation of the attack as we intend
to. Virtual Terrain Assisted Impact Assessment for Cyber Attacks
(VTAC) [1] proposes an algorithm for impact assessment. It utilizes
the Virtual Terrain model of the network and considers four im-
pact types: host impact (the potential damage done to a host with
respect to its services and their importance to the host), service
impact (how potentially compromised a particular service is over a
given network), user impact (how potentially damaged the hosts
are that a particular user has accounts on), and network impact
(how potentially damaged the entire network is with respect to the
alerts received per its machines). It utilizes basic calculations to esti-
mate the impact of the network. The disadvantages of the approach
are that it heavily depends on the estimation of importance, and
the calculations express more overall risk exposure to a network
than the impact of an actual attack. Future Situation and Impact
Awareness framework (FuSIA) [3] is a framework for estimating
the impact based on plausible futures. The plausible futures are
defined in terms of states of hosts in the network (normal, attacked,
discovered, partially compromised, compromised). The current sit-
uation in the network can evolve into a plausible future by event
happening (attacks). Several algorithms are proposed to search for
plausible futures and combine the results into a single set of futures
with re-computed plausibility scores. The two presented algorithms
determine plausible futures based on an attacker’s capability and
based on a possibility to attack. Recently, Huang et al. [4] proposed
a framework for assessing the impacts of cyber attacks in cyber-
physical systems. The risk assessment is based on predicting cyber
attack from conditional probabilities captured in a Bayesian net-
work. The paper provides a solid theoretical foundation, although
a presented case study is limited to a simulated industrial system.
Two works are of special importance for us as they focus on
mission resiliency. Lewis et al. [12] focused on an assessment of
the impact on mission resulting from cyber attacks. The authors
introduce a reference model for impact assessment and situation
projection, looks at the issue as a constraint satisfaction problem
depicted as a constraint network. It incorporates apparatus from
certainty factors theory as an alternative to Bayesian reasoning.
Jakobson [7] gives a detailed description of the mission resiliency
modeling issue. The mission resiliency system is modeled as two
interacting processes: the process of mission operation situation
management and the process of mission cyber defense situation
management. The resilient cyber defense system is based on adapt-
able resilient mission-centric architecture, and mission adaptation
policies.
Related work on decision logic focuses on finding optimal re-
sponse actions to attack. They are meant as a base for automated
defense. However, much of the reasoning behind optimal response
action selection could be applied to assessing a response benefit.
Lee at al. [11] explore the relevant cost factors, cost models, and
cost metrics. The authors separate the cost into five categories:
false negative cost (the damage cost due to successful intrusion by
undetected attack), true positive cost (the disruption of the service
caused by the response), false positive cost (the disruption of service
and availability due to falsely detected legal traffic), true negative
cost (always 0), and misclassified hit cost (the cost of reaction to a
wrong type of attack). The categories are closely based on detection
scenarios. Their approach points out the need to deal with uncer-
tainty with input parameters. The Adaptive intrusion response
using attack graphs (ADEPTS) [2] utilizes an I-Graph, the represen-
tation of possible attack graphs that captures the exploits, exploit
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preconditions, and channels required for intrusion spreading. The
optimal mitigation is the way to cut the channels that stops the
attacker from gaining the goal and minimizes the cost of unavail-
ability and the disruption of dependencies. However, to construct
the I-Graph, the authors need a complete database of vulnerabil-
ities, their descriptions, and complete system service description,
including the dependencies. The model for response selection by
Strasburg et al. [19] together with their previous work [20] focus
on cost estimation of a response. They propose a structured and
comprehensive methodology for estimating response cost. They
divide the cost into three parts: response operational cost, response
goodness and response impact on the system and provide a method
how to compute the partial costs and combine the partial costs
into the overall cost. Their approach requires a lot of human input
and is not scalable. For common usage, their methodology should
be extended by automated estimation of input parameters. Kheir
et al. [9] describe the service dependency model and provide a
complete methodology to use this model in order to evaluate in-
trusion and response costs. The authors search for responses with
best Return-on-Response-Investment, which compares the bene-
fit of the response with relation to the cost of its implementation.
They state several propagation patterns in which they consider
not only the damage caused by the propagation of dependency’s
functionality loss but also other types of propagation, such as the
propagation of positive effects and propagation of the dependent
service’s compromise on its dependencies. The response selection
model (REASSESS) [13] allows mitigating network-based attacks
by incorporating a response selection process that evaluates neg-
ative and positive impacts associated with each countermeasure.
The considered negative effects are the disturbance of the service
caused by the action, which takes into account the importance of
the service and the level of disturbance. The considered positive
effects are the response success rate for a given response and alert.
The concept of response success rate is interesting, because it does
not require any deep theoretical analysis of dependencies and is
based purely on the experience, however very imprecise in practice
since networks change too often to derive anymeaningful historical
data.
3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the necessary theoretical background for
our work. First, we introduce the constraint satisfaction problem.
Second, we introduce attack graphs and their extensions based on
Bayesian networks.
3.1 Constraint Satisfaction Problem
We use the constraint atisfaction abstraction modeling technique,
i.e., finding values of involved variables satisfying relevant con-
straints, for representation (correct description of mission config-
uration knowledge, details for problem visualization, etc.) as well
as for reasoning support, e.g., to provide explanations. Constraint
Satisfaction Problem (CSP) is supposed to be expressed via three
types of entities: variables, their associated domains, and constraints
relating to them.
Formally speaking, CSP is defined as a triple [X ,D,C], where X
is a set of variables, X1, ...,Xn ; D is a set of associated nonempty
domains, D1, ...,Dn ; and C is a set of constraints, C1, ...,Cm . A set
of possible values that can be assigned to variable defines the asso-
ciated domain. The constraint specifies allowable combinations of
variables’ values. Every constraintCj consists of constraint scope, a
subset of the variables, and a constraint relation over these variables,
a subset of the Cartesian product of involved variables’ domains. A
state of the problem is defined as an assignment of values to some
of the variables. So, searching for a problem solution corresponds
to searching in the space of states. An assignment of values to all of
the variables satisfying all of the constraints is called the solution
of CSP. The issue of finding a solution is referred to as satisfiability
of CSP.
Assuming that all the variables can be either true or false, then
we are dealing with the so-called Boolean Constraint System. A
Boolean CSP can be expressed as a Boolean formula. A Boolean
formula is composed of Boolean variables and the operators: and,
or, implication, bi-implication, not. Underlying mathematics says
that any propositional logic formula can be transformed into so-
called conjunctive normal form formula (conjunction of clauses, a
clause is a disjunction of literals, literal is a variable or its negation,
a variable can have a value of true or false).
3.2 Attack Graphs and Bayesian Networks
There are two formal models that we incorporated into our decision
support process, attack graphs and Bayesian networks. Herein, we
provide a necessary introduction into these two formalisms before
we start with the description of our proposed process.
Attack graph is a graphical representation of an attack scenario
that was introduced in 1998 by Phillips and Swiler [15] and quickly
became a popular method of formal representation of cyber attacks
and cybersecurity situation. Formally, an attack graph is a tuple
G = (S, r , S0, Ss ), where S is a set of states, r ⊆ S × S is a transition
relation, S0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states, and Ss ⊆ S is a set of
success states [18]. The initial state represents the state before
the attack starts. Transition relations represent possible actions
of an attacker. These are usually weighted, e.g., by the probability
that the attacker will choose the action. If an attacker takes all the
actions to transition from an initial state to any of the success states,
the attack is successful, as the success states represent a system
compromise [5]. A recent comprehensive taxonomy of attack graph
generation and usage was proposed by Kaynar [8].
From a practical perspective, the overview of attack graph tools
was given by Yi et al. [22]. The authors provide a comparison and
analysis of both open source and commercial tools. The most conve-
nient tool for our needs is MulVAL (Multihost, multistage, Vulnera-
bility Analysis) [14], a framework conducting vulnerability analysis
on a network. It comprises of scanners, that run on each host, and
an analyzer that processes the scan results and the information
about the vulnerability. Its main advantages are that it can process
vulnerability specification from publicly available sources automat-
ically, and the complexity of the algorithm for building an attack
graph is polynomial. The information about vulnerability effects
was taken from ICAT database that categorized the vulnerability
impact into four categories: confidentiality loss, availability loss,
integrity loss, and privilege escalation. From those categories, only
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availability loss and privilege escalation are considered in the frame-
work. The vulnerabilities are detected by running OVAL-scanner
on each host in the network. To achieve a polynomial complexity
of attack graph generation, logic programming and reasoning rules
are used to express the compromise propagation, the exploitability
of host, and network access.
While attack graphs serve well in describing the attack scenar-
ios and state transitions comprehensively, they miss the aspect of
probability and conditional variables. For this purpose, researchers
adopted Bayesian networks, probabilistic graph models that repre-
sent the variables and the relationships between them in the form
of an acyclic graph with nodes as the discrete or continuous ran-
dom variables and edges as the relationships between them. The
nodes maintain the states of the random variables and conditional
probability form.
There are several equivalent definitions of a Bayesian network.
Bayesian network is usually represented as a directed acyclic graph
(DAG). Each node represents a variable that has a certain set of
states. The edges represent the causal relationships between the
nodes. Formally, let G = (V ,E) be a DAG, and let X = (Xv )v ∈V
be a set of random variables indexed by V . A Bayesian Network
consists of a set of variables and a set of direct edges between
variables. Each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive states.
The variable and direct edge form a DAG. To each variable A with
parents B1,B2...Bn , there is attached a conditional probability table
P (A|B1,B2...Bn ).
Bayesian networks can be constructed from attack graphs. The
so-called Bayesian attack graphs were investigated in details by
Poolsappasit et al. [16]. The authors proposed a method to estimate
an organization’s security risks using the metrics defined in CVSS
and an attack graph extended by likelihoods of exploiting relation-
ships between the attack graph’s nodes. The processes of static and
dynamic risk assessment are proposed, along with a generation of
security risk mitigation plans.
4 MISSION DECOMPOSITION
In this section, we introduce our approach to enterprise mission de-
composition and modeling based on constraint satisfaction abstrac-
tion logic. First, we introduce the constraint satisfaction problem
as a theoretical background for our work. Subsequently, we discuss
modeling of the enterprise mission based on CSP. Finally, we illus-
trate the concept in a case study of a medical imaging information
system.
4.1 Mission Decomposition Model
We have decided to model mission’s configurations and related
reasoning as a CSP or specifically as a Boolean CSP. An enterprise
mission can be decomposed into relevant supportive processes.
Mission supportive processes are considered as key assets to be
protected. Individual supportive processes can be mapped into rele-
vant supportive IT services, and they can consequently be mapped
into supportive cyber components and their specific interactions.
We assume that enterprise missions can be accomplished in many
ways, i.e., reflecting current mission goals (functional and security
requirements), we are considering more alternatives to enterprise
mission configuration. Communication needs of a particular mis-
sion configuration are posed to the communication requirements of
employed cyber components and expressed in cyber terms. Mission
decomposition rules are expressed via special AND/OR nodes and
relevant edges in the graph representation. The AND/OR notation
is inspired by the work of Jakobson [7]. The model especially en-
ables expression of initial confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(CIA) requirements for every individual mission supportive pro-
cess as well as mapping of those requirements to relevant cyber
components.
Enterprise missions are considered in four dimensions: mission
functional requirements, mission security requirements, mission
operational configuration, and mission resilience. An enterprise
mission can be formally described as a system of functional re-
quirements. Desired functionalities are based on individual mission
supportive processes and consequently on individual IT services
and cyber components, respectively. Regarding the security, an
enterprise mission can be formally described as a system of secu-
rity requirements (expressed as desired levels of confidentiality,
integrity, and availability) based on individual mission supportive
processes and consequently on individual IT services and cyber
components, respectively. Mission operational configuration must
be in line with actual mission functional and security requirements
and be expressed as a specific configuration of mission supportive
entities and their specific interactions. Mission configuration alter-
natives are expressed via special AND/OR nodes and controlled by
AND/OR logic. AND-node in a particular mission configuration
requires the presence of all of its children nodes representing its
supportive IT services and cyber components, respectively. OR-
nodes express the options of mission reconfiguration as it requires
the presence of at least one of its children nodes representing its
supportive IT services and cyber components, respectively. Mission
resilience is its ability to continue to operate while maintaining the
required operational capabilities (desired functional and security
requirements) in the face of current adversary activities, its abil-
ity to achieve the mission’s current objectives. Mission resilience
depends upon the resilience of its supportive cyber components.
An example of a system modeled using our proposed approach
can be seen on Figure 1. Further information on the modeled system
and the process of modeling it can be found in the following sub-
section. The resulting logical formula representing the satisfying
configurations for the model in a given use case is presented in
Figure 2. The usage of the formula is described in Section 5.
4.2 Case Study: Regional Medical Imaging
To illustrate our proposed approach, we describe a case study of
mission decomposition model of a part of a regional medical imag-
ing system that enables region-wide collaboration of healthcare
service providers. First, we briefly describe the domain and the
system. Subsequently, we describe a mission decomposition model
of the system based on the approach presented previously.
The medical imaging domain consists of a spectrum of mutually
interconnected activities, the spectrum of individual collaborative
processes across many healthcare service providers. The supportive
IT environment is composed of domain-specific applications run-
ning on specially configured computer networks. Predefined rules
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Figure 1: Example of mission decomposition model.
φ =(TraumaCentre ) ∧
(Acquisition =⇒ TraumaCentre ) ∧
(Diaдnostics =⇒ TraumaCentre ) ∧
((PrimaryCT ∧ LocalPACS ∨ PrimaryCT ∧ ReдionalPACS ∨ SecondaryCT ∧ LocalPACS ∨ SecondaryCT ∧ ReдionalPACS )
=⇒ Acquisition) ∧
((LocalPACS ∧ LocalDiaдnostics ∨ ReдionalPACS ∧ ExternalDiaдnostics ) =⇒ Diaдnostics ) ∧
(Acquisition_PrimaryCT =⇒ PrimaryCT ) ∧ (Acquisition_SecondaryCT =⇒ SecondaryCT ) ∧
((PrimaryInstance_LocalPACS ∨ SecondaryInstance_LocalPACS ) =⇒ LocalPACS ) ∧
((LokalProxy_ReдionalPACS ∧ Server_ReдionalPACS ∧ RemoteProxy_ReдionalPACS ) =⇒ ReдionalPACS )∧
((PrimaryViewer_LocalDiaдnostics ∨ SecondaryViewer_LocalDiaдnostics ) =⇒ LocalDiaдnostics ) ∧
((RemoteViewer_ExternalDiaдnostics ) =⇒ ExternalDiaдnostics ).
Figure 2: Logical formula representing the satisfying mission configurations.
5
ARES ’19, August 26–29, 2019, Canterbury, United Kingdom M. Javorník et al.
describing all possible operational constellations of the mission in
line with functional and security requirements posed to individual
supportive processes constitute the basis of the model. The security
requirements posed to individual processes reflect the legal, ethical,
contractual or other issues. They are expressed as required levels
of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The core mission supportive processes in the area of medical
imaging are especially processes of patient examinations (specific
CT, MRI, roentgen examinations, mammography screening, etc.),
emergency consultations (neurology, cardiology, etc.), daily routine
of hospital’s departments dependent on image information, expert
consultations (oncology, mammography, etc.), and others. Support-
ive processes are being built on domain-specific IT services like
services of medical image data acquisition, institutional or regional
Picture Archiving and Communication System (PACS), services for
exchange and sharing of image data between individual hospital
departments and other cooperating healthcare institutions, services
necessary for medical image examinations’ diagnostics, etc. The
subsystem of supportive cyber components consists of a spectrum
of domain-specific products of many vendors: particular implemen-
tations of PACS, software components for controlling of acquisition
modalities, software for special medical image data processing,
software for specific diagnostic purposes, etc. Cyber components
communicate via a spectrum of medical domain-specific commu-
nication protocols reflecting the functional requirements of the
mission.
Next, we describe the scene of a trauma center. The center is
equipped with two computed tomography (CT) scanners placed
in the CT control room. CT-scanner is generally considered as
mandatory equipment of trauma centers, especially for patients
who had suffered from multiple traumas. The image examinations
are mostly diagnosed locally, but there is also a possibility the
examinations to be diagnosed remotely, so a radiologist to perform
an image analysis does not need to be present at a trauma center.
Trauma center’s critical processes are based on supportive services
alternatively provided by other institutions.
Two critical processes are forming the trauma center’s mission.
The first one is the acquisition process, labeled Acquisition, con-
sisting of performing CT examinations and pushing the acquired
image datasets to the communication system PACS to be accessible
for additional processing. The second one is the diagnostics process,
labeled Diagnostics, consisting of querying and retrieving medical
image examinations from archiving and communication system
PACS and performing desired diagnostics.
The two processes are based on the following supportive IT
services: services of medical image data acquisition, labeled Pri-
maryCT and SecondaryCT, services for secure image data com-
munication within trauma center or between distant healthcare
institutions in the region, labeled LocalPACS and RegionalPACS, and
services of local and external diagnostics of CT examinations, la-
beled LocalDiagnostics and ExternalDiagnostics. The IT services are
based on the following software components: software controlling
the image acquisition and forwarding the acquired data to PACS,
labeled Acquisition_PrimaryCT and Acquisition_SecondaryCT, soft-
ware implementations of primary and secondary instances of Local-
PACS service, labeled PrimaryInstance_LocalPACS and SecondaryIn-
stance_LocalPACS, software components implementing local or re-
mote proxies of RegionalPACS service, labeled LocalProxy_Regional-
PACS and RemoteProxy_RegionalPACS, software components im-
plementing central node of RegionalPACS service, labeled Central-
Node_RegionalPACS, software components implementing primary
or secondary local diagnostic viewers, labeled PrimaryViewer_Local-
Diagnostics and SecondaryViewer_LocalDiagnostics, software com-
ponent implementing remote diagnostic viewer, labeled Remote-
Viewer_ExternalDiagnostics.
5 DECISION SUPPORT PROCESS
In this section, we describe the concept of an analytical process
that utilizes the mission decomposition model and leads to decision
support. The basic starting point is the determination of a set of
constraints defining potential solutions and the determination of
utility functions expressing the interests of decision makers. We
are searching for a (semi)optimal solution of complex decision-
making problem. The goal is to propose mitigating steps and give
an explanation of the steps to network security administrators and
other relevant decision makers.
The continuous decision support process is depicted in Figure 3
and consists of three phases:
(1) The first phase is the construction of the mission decomposi-
tion model described in Section 4 and is executed only once.
The formal description of satisfying mission configurations
forms the basis for additional mathematical modeling. See
Figures 1 and 2 for examples. The model and formula are
used in the following phases as static information.
(2) The second phase deals with representing the current se-
curity situation. It uses the mission decomposition model
along with mathematically expressed constraints defining
satisfying mission configurations; it employs the techniques
of attack graphs and Bayesian networks as well as the ab-
stract knowledge on cyber threats and the attacker’s position
to generate resulting Bayesian attack graphs.
(3) The third phase integrates the static output of the first phase
and the dynamic output of the second phase. It identifies
the resulting optimal reconfigurations of the cyber compo-
nents with respect tomission resilience and countermeasures
against cyber threats.
The recommendation of a configuration of the system that reflects
the current security situation and mission constraints is the out-
put of the whole process. The recommended configuration should
then be set up manually or automatically. However, the change of
configuration changes the current situations, which returns the
process into the second phase. The backward arrow in the schema
in Figure 3 depicts the undertaken decision that caused changes in
the mission’s supportive computer networks configuration. As a
result, the second and third phases can be iterated indefinitely.
5.1 Representation of the Current State
Representation of the current state represents the second phase of
the process. It consists of generating a Bayesian attack graph (BAG)
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Figure 3: Phases of the analytical process for decision support.
from the static mission decomposition model provided by the first
phase (see Section 4) and dynamic abstract knowledge consisting of
information on threat vectors and the attacker’s position. Integrat-
ing the attacker’s position into the process requires collaboration
with intrusion detection systems and corresponds to the position
of an attacker in the attack graph and the procedure of actions the
attacker already executed.
The abstract knowledge of threats can be represented in numer-
ous ways and obtained from various sources. Herein, we propose
using the information on vulnerabilities from publicly available
sources, such as NVD1, a de facto standard library of vulnerabilities
in CVE format, or various vulnerability databases maintained by
software vendors or security specialists. Vulnerabilities in CVE are
accompanied by CVSS2, a scoring system that characterizes the
attack complexity and impact of vulnerabilities in terms of confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA triad). CVSS database, as
publicly accessible trusted information source, provides us with
quantitative characteristics necessary for attack graph building
and Bayesian network reasoning. Especially Attack Complexity
as specific security metric and Impact Metrics referring potential
impact (regarding CIA consequences for given cyber component)
of a successful exploit of a given vulnerability, i.e., privileges an
attacker will obtain as a consequence of a successful exploit. So,
employing CVSS Attack Complexity security metric (interpreted
as the conditional probability of successful exploit) enables compu-
tation of unconditional probabilities of successful multi-step attack
and exploits of mission-critical vulnerabilities.
To sum up the second phase, the particular steps goes as follows.
First, we generate the attack graph from available data, mission
1National Vulnerability Database, https://nvd.nist.gov/
2Common Vulnerability Scoring System, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss
decomposition model, and abstract knowledge. Mission decomposi-
tion model provides a list of IT systems for which we find vulnera-
bilities and weaknesses in NVD. The generation of the attack graph
could be achieved by MulVal [14]. Second, we take the attack graph
generated by MulVal and convert it into the Bayesian attack graphs.
The process will create an attack graph where leafs corresponding
to vulnerabilities have a probability equal to exploitability score
from CVSS. The structure of the attack graph is not changed in this
step; only the probabilities are updated. As a result of the two steps,
we have a model of the static security situation, including mission
view. If appropriate data are available, we can insert the attacker’s
position into the attack graph. This could be achieved in cooper-
ation with an intrusion detection system or similar tool that can
report exploitation of a vulnerability or similar event. The attack
graph and Bayesian attack graphs should be recalculated if needed.
As an output, we have a Bayesian attack graph that represents the
current security situation. The evaluation is performed in the third
phase.
5.2 Decision Support
In the third phase, we take the outputs of previous phases and
choose the optimal (the most resilient) mission configuration us-
ing the sound mathematical grounding of constraint satisfaction
problem and Bayesian networks. More mathematically formulated:
“considering the stochastic nature of the issue and the explicitly
formulated mission’s configuration constraints, we optimize util-
ity function expressing the interests of decision makers.” Bayesian
networks allow us to quantify the desired likelihood of successful
exploit of vulnerabilities of the given cyber component in the net-
work. In other words, they allow us to calculate the unconditional
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probability of an adversary exploits the system. The constraint rea-
soning uses the logical expression to check which configurations of
the system preserve its functionality if countermeasures are taken
to mitigate the threats calculated by the stochastic reasoning.
The proposed approach helps us to understand and measure the
vulnerability of an enterprise mission as the likelihood of success-
ful exploit of those left vulnerabilities which are critical for our
mission. Nevertheless, the final decision on countermeasures and
reconfigurations of the system are in the hands of human operators.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a novel approach to decision support for
cyber defense that takes enterprise missions into account. First, we
proposed an enterprise mission decomposition model employing
constraint satisfaction mathematical abstraction formally describ-
ing mission requirements as well as complex relationships between
mission supportive entities. The model was supported by a case
study of a regional medical imaging system for which we created
the model. Subsequently, we proposed an analytical process that
takes the mission decomposition model and abstract knowledge
of cyber attacks to generate the stochastic model of the security
situation that can be used to provide decision support to secu-
rity operations. The combination of the mission decomposition
model and analytical process allows for making decisions, such
as system reconfiguration and access restriction, with respect to
the importance and requirements of the underlying IT systems
to enterprise missions. Proposed analytical framework (especially
underlying stochastic model) covers the complex relationships of a
real-world situation which are necessary for quantification of the
situation. It enables to count useful quantitative characteristics: the
unconditional probability of mission disruption (successful exploit
of critical vulnerabilities of mission operational configurations),
prioritization of security-related steps, dynamic categorization of
cyber components, etc.
In our future work, we are going to implement the tools to per-
form the proposed decision support process. Subsequently, we want
to evaluate our approach on a real-world IT system, such as the
medical information system that we already used for mission de-
composition, as well as in a simulated scenario. In the first case,
we want to evaluate the feasibility of our approach in practice. In
the second case, we want to create a benchmark for further opti-
mization. Further, we want to evaluate the feasibility of automated
decision making in cyber defense, so that we may relief human
operators in their duties even more.
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